Lecture 1 slides: “Introduction”
The original lecture deck (a 54-page PDF of PowerPoint slides) is rebuilt here as accessible HTML: one section per slide, real text instead of images of text, descriptions in place of figures, and speaker notes as visible text.
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Slides
Slide 1 of 54
9.00. Intro to Psychology
Professor John Gabrieli
Speaker note
Title slide. Welcome to 9.00, Introduction to Psychology. I'm John Gabrieli, and this lecture introduces the scientific study of human nature.
Slide 2 of 54
Objective
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
Speaker note
The course objective in one line: a scientific study of human nature — mind and behavior.
Slide 3 of 54
Topics of the course
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
- brain
- perception
- cognition
- emotion
- personality
- development
- social interaction
- psychopathology
Speaker note
The topics we will cover this semester: brain, perception, cognition, emotion, personality, development, social interaction, and psychopathology.
Slide 4 of 54
The human brain
Photograph of a human brain (lateral view), shown at true scale with a 5 cm ruler.
Long description of the visual
The photograph shows a preserved human brain viewed from the side, with its characteristic folded cortex, cerebellum, and brain stem visible. A scale bar marked 5 cm emphasizes that the brain is a physical object of modest size. The image is credited “Reproduced (or adapted) with permission from http://www.brains.rad.msu.edu and http://brainmuseum.org, supported by the US National Science Foundation.” The third-party photograph is not reproduced here; see the credited brain museums for the original.
Speaker note
We study a physical organ. Everything we will discuss — mind, behavior — is about this 3-pound structure. The image comes from the University of Wisconsin and Michigan State comparative brain collection.
Slide 5 of 54
A psychocentric view
Diagram of psychology at the center, surrounded by other disciplines of the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences.
After Peter Gray, “The Value of Psychology 101 in Liberal Arts Education: A Psychocentric Theory of the University.” Observer (APS), October 2008.
Long description of the visual
The diagram places Psychology in a hexagon at the center. Around it, three labeled clusters: Natural Sciences — Physics, Chemistry, Biology; Social Sciences — Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science, Economics; Humanities — Music, Art, Language, Literature, Philosophy, Theology, and Math (Logic). Lines connect Psychology to every discipline. The point: psychology connects to nearly every field of a liberal-arts education, and each field informs it.
Speaker note
Peter Gray's 'psychocentric' view: psychology sits at the center of the university's map of knowledge. It draws on the natural sciences, contributes to the social sciences, and shares questions with the humanities.
Slide 6 of 54
How our minds make our worlds
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds
Speaker note
The first theme of the lecture: how our minds make our worlds — what we see, what we hear, what we know.
Slide 7 of 54
What we see
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds — what we see
Speaker note
We begin with vision: what we see is constructed by the mind, as these illusions will show.
Slide 8 of 54
Müller-Lyer illusion
Long description of the visual
The classic Müller-Lyer display: two horizontal lines stacked vertically. The upper line is bounded at both ends by arrowheads pointing outward (opening away from the line), which makes it look longer. The lower line is bounded by arrowheads pointing inward (toward the line), which makes it look shorter. Measured, the two lines are the same length — the arrows, not the lines, drive the impression.
Speaker note
The two lines are exactly the same length. Your visual system constructs 'longer' and 'shorter' from context. (In the lecture, students vote on which line is longer before the reveal.)
Slide 9 of 54
Müller-Lyer illusion, comparison
Long description of the visual
The same two horizontal lines presented for direct comparison, aligned so the equal lengths are obvious once the arrowheads are ignored.
Speaker note
Shown together, the illusion collapses: the lines are identical. Seeing is not believing — the mind constructs what we see.
Slide 10 of 54
Ebbinghaus illusion
Long description of the visual
Two arrangements of circles. On the left, a red center circle is surrounded by five large black circles. On the right, an identical red center circle is surrounded by six small black circles. Because of the surrounding context, the left center circle appears smaller than the right one, although the two center circles are the same size.
Speaker note
The two red circles are identical. Surrounded by big circles it looks small; surrounded by small circles it looks big. Context warps size perception — 'Ebbinghaus' refers to the psychologist this display is named after.
Slide 11 of 54
Shepard's “Terror Subterra”
Long description of the visual
A perspective drawing of a stone-walled corridor. One figure stands close to the viewer at the near end; an identical figure stands at the far end. Depth cues make the near figure appear far larger, yet the two silhouettes are the same size when measured. Source: Shepard, R. Mind Sights: Original Visual Illusions, Ambiguities, and Other Anomalies, W. H. Freeman & Co., 1990. This copyrighted image is excluded from the Creative Commons license and is described here rather than reproduced.
Speaker note
Roger Shepard's 'Terror Subterra.' The two figures are drawn identical — depth cues make them look different. The original drawing is copyrighted (W. H. Freeman) and excluded from our Creative Commons license, so we describe it rather than copy it.
Slide 12 of 54
Checker-shadow illusion
Checker-shadow illusion. Courtesy of Professor Edward H. Adelson. Used with permission.
Long description of the visual
Edward Adelson's checker-shadow illusion: a checkerboard drawn in perspective with a green cylinder standing on it, casting a diagonal shadow. Two marked squares — A on the light region, B within the shadow — appear to be different shades of gray (A light, B dark), but they are physically identical; the visual system discounts the shadow. This image is used with Professor Adelson's permission; see the MIT Perceptual Science Group's 'Lightness Perception and Lightness Illusions' gallery.
Speaker note
Adelson's checker-shadow: squares A and B are the same gray. Your visual system 'subtracts' the shadow automatically. We use this with Professor Adelson's permission.
Slide 13 of 54
Visual/optical illusions (list 1)
- Criss-Cross Effect
- The Koffka Ring
- White's Illusion
- Simultaneous Contrast Effect
From “Lightness Perception and Lightness Illusions,” MIT Perceptual Science Group.
Speaker note
More lightness illusions demonstrated in the lecture, from the MIT Perceptual Science Group's gallery: criss-cross effect, Koffka ring, White's illusion, and simultaneous contrast.
Slide 14 of 54
Illusions cont'd
- Shepard's Tables
- Stepping Feet
- Shading, Depth, and Faces
Speaker note
And three more: Shepard's tables (two tabletops that look different but are identical parallelograms), the stepping-feet motion illusion, and shading-depth-face ambiguity.
Slide 15 of 54
Memory for a picture
10 questions
Speaker note
Next demonstration: memory for a picture. Ten yes/no questions are coming.
Slide 16 of 54
Memory for a picture — Group A
Group A: You are going to look briefly at a picture and then answer some questions about it. The picture is a rough sketch of a poster for a trained seal act. Do not dwell on the picture. Look at it only long enough to “take it all in” once. After that, you will answer yes or no to a series of questions.
Speaker note
Group A's instructions say the sketch is a poster for a trained seal act. The instruction itself is part of the experiment — it will shape what people remember.
Slide 17 of 54
Memory for a picture — Group B
Group B: You are going to look briefly at a picture and then answer some questions about it. The picture is a rough sketch of a poster for a costume ball. Do not dwell on the picture. Look at it only long enough to “take it all in” once. After that, you will answer yes or no to a series of questions.
Speaker note
Group B gets the identical picture, described as a poster for a costume ball. Same image, different label — memory will differ.
Slide 18 of 54
The ambiguous picture
Long description of the visual
A minimal line drawing: two ambiguous human figures on a small stage beneath a fringed canopy. The seated figure holds a round object that could be read as a seal balancing a ball or as a costume ball — the drawing supports both captions. The original slide credits: Source: Weiten, Wayne. Psychology: Themes and Variations. Cengage Learning, 2010. © Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from the Creative Commons license; more information is available at the OCW terms page.
Speaker note
This is the picture both groups saw. If you were told 'trained seal,' you probably remember a seal; if you were told 'costume ball,' you remember a ball. Memory is reconstructive — the label shaped what was stored. The image is Cengage-copyrighted and excluded from the CC license, so it is described rather than reproduced.
Slide 19 of 54
In the picture was there:
| # | Question | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | An automobile? | ____ | ____ |
| 2. | A man? | ____ | ____ |
| 3. | A woman? | ____ | ____ |
| 4. | A child? | ____ | ____ |
| 5. | An animal? | ____ | ____ |
| 6. | A whip? | ____ | ____ |
| 7. | A sword? | ____ | ____ |
| 8. | A man’s hat? | ____ | ____ |
| 9. | A ball? | ____ | ____ |
| 10. | A fish? | ____ | ____ |
Speaker note
The ten questions. 'A ball?' — seal group says yes; 'a sword?' — costume-ball group may say yes. The answers reveal how suggestion rewrote memory.
Slide 20 of 54
Memory for a picture — Group A (repeat)
Group A: You are going to look briefly at a picture and then answer some questions about it. The picture is a rough sketch of a poster for a trained seal act. Do not dwell on the picture. Look at it only long enough to “take it all in” once. After that, you will answer yes or no to a series of questions.
Speaker note
Group A's slide, shown again for the classroom demonstration.
Slide 21 of 54
Ambiguous numeral
Long description of the visual
Two renditions of an ambiguous glyph. Read by itself (or as a number), it is seen as “13”; the same shape in a letter context is read as “B”. The stroke pattern is identical — interpretation depends on context.
Speaker note
Thirteen, or B? The same drawing is '13' among numbers and 'B' among letters. Perception uses context instantly and unconsciously.
Slide 22 of 54
A test of attention & counting!
HOW MANY TIMES DO THE PEOPLE IN THE WHITE SHIRTS PASS THE BASKETBALL?
Speaker note
The famous selective-attention task: count the passes made by the people in white shirts. Watch carefully.
Slide 23 of 54
A test of attention & counting! (video)
Watch video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo
Speaker note
The 'gorillas in our midst' video (Simons & Chabris). Most viewers counting white-shirt passes never see the person in the gorilla suit walk through. Attention is selective — and we are blind to our own blindness.
Slide 24 of 54
What we hear
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds — what we hear
Speaker note
From seeing to hearing: what we hear is also constructed by the mind.
Slide 25 of 54
What is he saying? (McGurk demo)
McGurk Effect Demo — http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFPtc8BVdJk
Speaker note
The McGurk effect demonstration video. Listen to the syllable, then listen again while watching the lips.
Slide 26 of 54
What is he saying? (result)
- Most adults (98%) think they hear “DA”
- In reality, you
- hear the sound “BA”
- see the lip movements “GA”
H. McGurk & J. MacDonald, Nature, 1976
Speaker note
The audio says BA; the lips say GA; nearly everyone hears DA. Hearing itself fuses sight and sound — the McGurk & MacDonald effect (Nature, 1976).
Slide 27 of 54
What we know
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds — what we know
Speaker note
The third construction: what we know — how knowledge and belief shape judgment.
Slide 28 of 54
Which is farther east: San Diego or Reno?
Speaker note
Vote! Most people say Reno is farther east. In fact San Diego, California, lies farther east than Reno, Nevada — mental maps are distorted by borders and coastlines.
Slide 29 of 54
Which is farther north: Philadelphia or Rome, Italy?
Speaker note
Rome feels farther north because it is 'Europe.' Philadelphia is slightly farther north than Rome.
Slide 30 of 54
Which is farther north: Atlanta or Chicago?
Speaker note
Chicago 'feels' northern, Atlanta southern — yet they are at nearly the same latitude; Chicago is actually slightly farther north... most people are surprised. Mental maps compress and stretch geography.
Slide 31 of 54
Which is farther north: Portland or Toronto?
Speaker note
Most people say Toronto. Portland, Oregon, is farther north than Toronto.
Slide 32 of 54
Which is further west: Miami, Florida or Santiago, Chile?
Speaker note
Miami sits far west of the US east coast image people hold — it is farther west than Santiago, Chile. Knowledge (here, mental maps) is constructed, not photographed reality.
Slide 33 of 54
What we learn and remember
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds — what we learn and remember
Speaker note
Now: what we learn and remember — including the automatic habits of mind we barely notice.
Slide 34 of 54
Listen, then write
LISTEN TO THE WORDS, THEN WRITE DOWN THE WORDS YOU REMEMBER
Speaker note
A memory demonstration: I will read a list of words; write down as many as you remember. (In the lecture this segues into the 'one way not to do enter' false-memory demo.)
Slide 35 of 54
Automaticity
- Power
- Peril
Speaker note
Automaticity: mental processes that run without deliberate control. The power: fast, effortless thinking. The peril: systematic errors we don't notice.
Slide 36 of 54
ONE WAY NOT DO ENTER
Long description of the visual
A road-sign style demonstration: a gray rectangle with the words “ONE WAY NOT DO ENTER.” Read automatically, the phrase feels meaningful; read deliberately, it is ungrammatical. The demonstration appears again as a triangle version on the next slide.
Speaker note
Read it quickly — it feels fine. Automatic reading glues the words together; only deliberate attention notices 'ONE WAY NOT DO ENTER' is word salad.
Slide 37 of 54
PARIS IN THE THE SPRING
Long description of the visual
A gray triangle containing the words “PARIS IN THE THE SPRING.” Most readers report 'Paris in the spring' — the duplicated “the” is invisible to automatic reading.
Speaker note
'Paris in the the spring' — nearly everyone misses the doubled 'the.' Automaticity's peril in miniature.
Slide 38 of 54
How many F's?
Speaker note
Count the F's in the next sentence — quickly!
Slide 39 of 54
The F-sentence
FINISHED FILES ARE THE RE-SULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIF-IC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS
Speaker note
“FINISHED FILES ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF MANY YEARS.” There are six F's — most people find three, because the F in 'of' is pronounced like a V and automatic reading skips it.
Slide 40 of 54
Stroop effect — word set #1
Long description of the visual
A five-row grid of color words. In set #1 each word is printed in ink that matches its meaning: RED in red, GREEN in green, BLUE in blue, YELLOW in yellow, PINK in pink, ORANGE in orange, WHITE in white, BROWN in brown.
Speaker note
Set #1: name the INK color of each word aloud, row by row. It's easy — the word and the color agree.
Slide 41 of 54
Stroop effect — word set #2
Long description of the visual
The same grid of color words, but now every word is printed in a conflicting ink: RED in blue, GREEN in blue, BLUE in green, YELLOW in pink, PINK in orange, ORANGE in blue, WHITE in blue, BROWN in red, and so on.
Speaker note
Set #2: the same task, now the word and the ink conflict. Reading is so automatic that it fights color-naming — responses slow and error-prone. That conflict is the Stroop effect.
Slide 42 of 54
Birthday probability
There are 30 people in a group. You get the month and date of each person’s birthday. What is the approximate probability that two of the people will have the exact same birthday?
- a) 90%
- b) 70%
- c) 50%
- d) 30%
- e) 10%
Speaker note
Vote: with 30 people, how likely is a shared birthday? Most say 10 or 30 percent. The answer is about 70%. Statistical intuition is systematically miscalibrated.
Slide 43 of 54
Cognitive & affective forecasting
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE FORECASTING
- think about your future
Speaker note
Affective forecasting: predicting how we will feel in the future. We are remarkably bad at it — and this has consequences for big decisions.
Slide 44 of 54
Affective forecasting
- think about your future
most people think about achieving & succeeding rather than fumbling or failing
Speaker note
Most people forecast achievement and success rather than fumbling or failing — an optimistic default.
Slide 45 of 54
Affective forecasting (tenure & lottery)
- if I don’t get tenure, I will be sad… if I do get tenure I will be happy
- two years later - no difference
- if I win the lottery, I will be happy!
- a year or two later, no difference
Speaker note
Classic findings: assistant professors are sure tenure decides their happiness — two years later, tenured and denied are indistinguishable. Lottery winners return to baseline happiness within a year or two. We overestimate how long events will move us.
Slide 46 of 54
Affective forecasting (accident)
- if I don’t get tenure, I will be sad… if I do get tenure I will be happy
- two years later - no difference
- if I win the lottery, I will be happy!
- a year or two later, no difference
- accident leading to quadriplegia or paraplegia - return to typical ratings in 3 months
Speaker note
And the hardest example: people who became quadriplegic or paraplegic return to typical happiness ratings within about three months. The forecasting machine in the head systematically mispredicts.
Slide 47 of 54
Mispredicting responses to racism
Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Response to Racism — Kawakami et al., Science, 2009
- Racism is condemned
- Blatant racism still occurs
- 33% of whites report hearing anti-black slurs in workplace
Speaker note
Kawakami and colleagues (Science, 2009) asked: do people know how they — and others — respond to racism? Racism is condemned in principle; a third of white respondents report hearing anti-Black slurs in the workplace.
Slide 48 of 54
Forecaster vs. experiencer design
- two groups - “forecaster” or “experiencer”
- you enter room - see a black male & a white male - black male leaves room to get cell phone, gently bumps white male knee
- control - nothing else
- moderate slur “Typical, I hate it when black people do that”
- extreme slur …. “clumsy N word”
- black male returns, experimenter gives survey on current feelings, asks you to pick a partner for anagram task
Speaker note
The design: two groups — 'forecasters' imagine the scenario; 'experiencers' live it. The black male confederate leaves, then bumps the white male's knee — with no comment, a moderate slur, or an extreme slur. Then: rate your feelings, and choose a partner for the anagram task.
Slide 49 of 54
Forecasters predict outrage
- two groups - “forecaster” or “experiencer”
- control - nothing else
- moderate slur “Typical, I hate it when black people do that”
- extreme slur …. “clumsy N word”
- black male returns, experimenter gives survey on current feelings, asks you to pick a partner for anagram task
Speaker note
Forecasters predict they would be outraged by the slurs and would avoid the slur-saying partner. What did the experiencers actually do? The next two slides show the gap.
Slide 50 of 54
A gap between attitudes & actions (distress)
Graph shows experiencer reports consistently lower distress than forecaster.
Long description of the visual
Bar chart, “Negative Emotional Distress” (0–9 scale, bars with error bars), three conditions on the x-axis. Forecaster (predicted) versus Experiencer (reported): No Comment — forecaster about 4.5, experiencer about 3.1; Moderate Racist Comment — forecaster about 7.4, experiencer about 3.8; Extreme Racist Comment — forecaster about 7.0, experiencer about 3.8. People who imagine the event predict more distress than people who actually experience it report. Image by MIT OpenCourseWare; see Kawakami, K., et al. “Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism.” Science 323, no. 5911 (2009): 276–8.
Speaker note
Forecasters predicted high distress, especially after the slurs. Experiencers reported much less distress in every condition — affective misprediction again, now about moral events.
Slide 51 of 54
A gap between attitudes & actions (partner choice)
Graph shows experiencer chooses white partners more often when following racist comments.
Long description of the visual
Bar chart, “Percentage of White Partners Chosen” (0–100), three conditions. Forecaster (predicted) versus Experiencer (actual): No Comment — forecaster about 68%, experiencer about 53%; Moderate Racist Comment — forecaster about 10%, experiencer about 66%; Extreme Racist Comment — forecaster about 24%, experiencer about 62%. People who imagined the event predicted they would strongly avoid the slur-saying partner; people who experienced it chose the white partner at similar rates across conditions. Image by MIT OpenCourseWare; see Kawakami, K., et al. “Mispredicting Affective and Behavioral Responses to Racism.” Science 323, no. 5911 (2009): 276–8.
Speaker note
And the actions: forecasters predicted they would refuse the racist partner; experiencers actually chose the white partner at nearly the same rate in every condition. Attitudes and actions diverge — the gap this lecture ends on.
Slide 52 of 54
What the course covers
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
how our minds make our worlds
- what we see & hear
- what we remember
- what we know
- how we think
- how we feel
- how we act
Speaker note
The course map: how our minds make our worlds — what we see and hear, what we remember, what we know, how we think, how we feel, and how we act.
Slide 53 of 54
Closing
Objective: Scientific study of human nature/mind/behavior
Speaker note
Closing slide. This lecture introduced the themes of the whole course; the next unit begins with the brain.
Slide 54 of 54
MIT OpenCourseWare
MIT OpenCourseWare — http://ocw.mit.edu
9.00SC Introduction to Psychology, Fall 2011
For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.
Speaker note
Publisher slide: MIT OpenCourseWare citation and terms of use.
Chart data tables
Slides 51 and 52 present the Kawakami et al. findings as bar charts. The original chart images have embedded alt text in the PDF, but the numbers are only available visually. The tables below give the approximate values read from the charts.
| Condition | Forecaster (predicted) | Experiencer (reported) |
|---|---|---|
| No comment | ≈ 4.5 | ≈ 3.1 |
| Moderate racist comment | ≈ 7.4 | ≈ 3.8 |
| Extreme racist comment | ≈ 7.0 | ≈ 3.8 |
| Condition | Forecaster (predicted) | Experiencer (actual) |
|---|---|---|
| No comment | ≈ 68% | ≈ 53% |
| Moderate racist comment | ≈ 10% | ≈ 66% |
| Extreme racist comment | ≈ 24% | ≈ 62% |
Source
Transcribed and adapted from Lecture 1: Introduction slides
(MIT9_00SCF11_lec01.pdf), 9.00SC Introduction to Psychology, Fall
2011, Prof. John Gabrieli, MIT OpenCourseWare, CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 US. Speaker notes
were written for this remediation to make each slide’s role in the lecture
explicit; they are marked as notes, not as the lecturer’s words. The lecturer’s
own words are in the transcript.